PERMALINK Posted 11:23 PM by Jordan
Sago Update: Malfunctioning Alarms, Missing Lightning Arrestors, Weak Seals
and an "Improbably Agile Bolt of Lightning"
Workplace accidents generally have many causes. There are the "direct"
causes -- someone pushed the wrong button, didn't follow written
procedures or ignored an alarm.
Then there are the root, or systemic causes: the pressure to speed
productoin that causes workers to rush and neglect safe work
procedures, written procedures that don't match the current
configuration of the workplace and that no one is trained to follow,
alarms that are always malfunctioning, so everyone ignores them.
So when you seen something like this, you need to suspect that there's
something bad going on in this workplace.
At 6:10 a.m. on Jan. 2, a light on Sago Mine dispatcher Bill
Chisolm's computer screen changed from green to red.
The red light was an alarm. It warned Chisolm of an increase in
carbon monoxide levels along the conveyor belt in Sago's 1 Left
section.
Under mine policy and federal rules, the 26 parts per million of
carbon monoxide detected should have prompted an evacuation.
Workers should have been cleared from areas deeper underground,
probably including a crew headed to work in the next section over,
called 2 Left.
But Chisolm ignored the alarm. He was sure it was a malfunction,
and not a real signal of any problems underground, according to a
sworn statement given to government investigators.
About 20 minutes later, shortly after 6:30 a.m., an explosion
ripped through the Sago Mine.
First reaction is "Ah ha! Stupid worker mistake. Fire the bastard and
all will be well."
But not so fast.
First, that alarm may not have been warning of the conditions that led
to the explosion and fire that killed 12 Sago miners. But more
important, further investigation reveals that Bill Chisolm's failure
to heed the alarm points not to an individual mistake, but to serious
systemic safety problems at the mine.
Under federal rules, mine dispatchers are required to closely
investigate the cause of any carbon monoxide alarm that indicates
more than 10 parts per million of the gas. Miners who are not
investigating the problem are to be evacuated from the area, the
rules state.
At Sago, several mine dispatchers testified that they received very
limited training on how to respond to mine carbon monoxide alarms.
Several dispatchers were unable to answer detailed questions
investigators asked about logs from the mine's carbon monoxide
monitoring system.
Dispatcher Nathan Eye testified that when he took the job, it "was
supposed to be a temporary position over there, and I kind of got
stuck with it."
Eye said he did not know what concentration of carbon monoxide
would require a mine evacuation.
"It had never really been discussed, but I would figure anything
about 20 parts per million would be way too much to leave anybody
[inside]," Eye said.
Dispatchers told investigators that the carbon monoxide alarms
frequently malfunctioned at the Sago Mine.
"I've had CO monitors malfunction for no apparent reason,"
dispatcher Vernon Hofer said during a Jan. 23 interview. "They just
malfunction.
"And I don't know the cause of the malfunction or why they -- and
when they show an alarm, if at the point in time that I check them,
everything appears to be OK," Hofer said.
Dispatchers also indicated they used the alarm system for purposes
other than keeping an eye on carbon monoxide levels.
Chisolm told investigators that dispatchers would set off audible
carbon monoxide alarms in the Sago Mine, "if you're having trouble
getting a hold of a section, it could be maybe your mom called,
she's in the hospital or anything."
In interviews with investigators, Sago Mine managers also have
revealed that they regularly failed to keep accurate records of the
operations of the mine fan that was meant to keep clean air flowing
through the underground workings.
Meanwhile the ongoing investigation of the Sago disaster is focusing
on what caused the methane explosion in a closed off part of the mine.
Sago's owner, International Coal Group (ICG), issued a report saying
that a lightning strike caused the explosion. But investigators can't
figure out how what the Pittsburgh Post Gazette calls "an improbably
agile bolt of lightning" traveled 1-1/2 miles from the mouth of the
mine, across the Buckhannon River, then another 13,000 feet to the
sealed portion of the mine.
And blaming the explosion on lightning -- even if it's true -- may not
get ICG off the hook. Ken Ward of the Charleston Gazette also reports
that
The Sago Mine violated basic electrical safety rules by not
installing equipment to prevent lightning from sending a charge
into underground mine workings, U.S. and West Virginia
investigators have learned.
At least two electrical systems at Sago were not equipped with
lightning arresters similar to surge protectors, the mine's chief
electrician told investigators in a sworn statement.
***
Sago Mine owner International Coal Group has pushed the theory that
lightning caused the explosion. But company press releases have not
mentioned the serious electrical violations related to the lack of
lightning-protection devices.
***
Under federal mine safety rules, all power lines and phone cables
that lead into underground mines must be equipped with lightning
arresters.
Lightning arresters are protective devices that limit surges of
electricity from lightning strikes or equipment failures. They
prevent damage to electrical equipment and, in the case of
underground coal mines, help to prevent lightning from sparking
fires or explosions.
Oops.
The investigation is also looking into the blocks that were used to
seal the closed-off part of the mine:
The seals were constructed from Omega Block, a cement-and-fiber
foam block favored by many mine operators because they are lighter
than the traditional cement blocks used to seal abandoned areas of
mines.
The Mine Safety and Health Administration first approved the blocks
for use nearly a decade ago, but more recently allowed the
installation of the blocks without the traditional "hitching" --
the practice of digging a notch into the mine wall and ceiling to
secure the seal. Unhitched Omega Block walls were approved after
one such wall withstood the minimum 20 pounds per square inch blast
pressure during a test of seals meant to be erected during mine
emergencies.
But testimony by the men who installed the seals at Sago suggests
the wall did not follow the approved plan in all instances and did
not match the construction of the Omega Block wall that passed a 20
psi test.
Notably, they testified that they leveled out the floor by laying
dry mortar into gaps in the mine floor and then setting the wall
atop it. Plans called for all sides of the block floor to be
mortared with a special product called BlocBond.
Kathy Snyder at Minesafety Watch reports that a two-day public hearing
into the Sago tragedy starts tomorrow in Buckhannon, W.Va. MSHA and
the state will be running the hearings jointly. Davitt McAteer, former
head of MSHA, is chairing.
Labels: Coal Mining, Sago
PERMALINK Posted 10:19 PM by Jordan
AFL and Change To Win: Back To The Future, or Something....
I'm ust getting around to writing about this mildly amusing and ironic
story. NY Times labor reporter Steve Greenhouse reported last week
about a proposal by Change to Win (the unions that broke away from the
AFL-CIO last year) to get together with the AFL-CIO to form another
labor federation that would do many of the things they criticized the
AFL-CIO for spending too many resources on: political action,
grass-roots mobilization, member education, legislative initiatives,
and health and safety.
Change to Win Chair Anna Burger sent a letter to AFL-CIO President
John Sweeney on April 11 suggesting they work together on common
issues:
Several important pending issues, including immigration, health
care, retirement security, labor law reform and the looming 2006
election cycle make it imperative that we coordinate our strategies
and resources in the interests of all working people in this
country.
She suggested creating a "permanent structure"
In a response, Sweeney declared himself "mystified" at Burger's
proposal to create "a third federation," and although he supports
coordinating strategies and resources,
the last thing we can imagine doing -- less than ayear after SEIU,
UFCW, UNITE HERE and the Teamsters voluntarily left the Federation
-- is investing time and resources in "cofounding" yet a third
labor federation, with all the bureacracy, expense and additional
staffing that would entail. And we cannot ignore the irony that the
united federation of all unions that you propose...precisely
describes the work of the AFL-CIO before the disaffiliations last
July.
Now I'm not privy to all the inside plotting and planning of all the
different sides, but on the surface it looks like Change to Win is
figuring out that while greatly increased organizing is essential to
ensuring workers' rights, it's not sufficient: you also need to
translate some of that energy into policy and political power in
Washington where many of the programs are developed and implemented
that can help -- or hurt -- working people.
One of those important issues, of course, is workplace safety and
health. And although Change to Win unions are doing a good job
integrating workplace safety with organizing (in their hotel campaign
and University of Florida, for example), they have no political
program equivalent to the dearly departed AFL-CIO health and Safety
Department (R.I.P.) or even the activities of the remaining AFL-CIO
health and safety staff.
So here's my suggestion: Both federations should take note of the life
and death struggles that workers are facing every day on the job, and
both should establish well-staffed and fully funded health and safety
departments -- which could then coordinate their activities in
Washington and in workplaces around the country.
Now there's a crazy proposal I could get behind.
Labels: AFL-CIO
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Google Groups Subscribe to Confined Space
Email: ____________________
Subscribe
Browse Archives at groups.google.com
Google _______________________________ Google Search
(_) Search WWW (_) Search Confined Space
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
DISCLAIMER: The views expressed in this Blog are my own and do not, in
any way, shape or form, reflect or represent the views or policies of
my employer. Links to or from other websites of individuals or
organizations do not constitute an endorsement of these views.
_________________________________________________________________
Home
Archive
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Looking for Confined Space Safety Information?
Click Here
_________________________________________________________________
_______________
(_)
Search Web (_) Search Confined Space
Search
_________________________________________________________________
Greatest Hits
BP Texas City Explosion Stories
2006 Mine Disaster Stories
Popcorn Lung Stories
Speech on Receiving the APHA Lorin Kerr Award
by Jordan Barab, November 9, 2004
_________________________________________________________________
Top 10 Workplace Safety Stories of 2006
Top 10 Workplace Safety Stories of 2005
Top 10 Workplace Safety Stories of 2004
Top 14 Workplace Safety Stories of 2003
_________________________________________________________________
Acts of God, Acts of Man," by Jordan Barab, Working USA
Lies, Partisanship Caused Ergo Standard to Crumble, by Jordan Barab,
Safety + Health, February 2002
A Week of Death, by Jordan Barab, Hazards, February 5, 2003
Recent Posts
* One Million Visitors!
* Beyond Confined Space
* Goodbye: The Final Curtain Comes Down
* A Son, A Father, 911 and The President
* What's In A Name? (Part II)
* Moving On: Closing Up Shop
* Libby Asbestos Activist Dies; Residents Consider B...
* Hazardous Trenches, Good Luck and Bad Journalism
* Nothing New About Trench Collapses
* Chilling Reading
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
Read Much?
Books Are Good
When you shop at Powells, I get a commission.
______ search
Click here for the Confined Space Reading List
_________________________________________________________________
Click here for the Powells Labor Bookshelf
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
News Headlines
_________________________________________________________________
Archives
March 2003
April 2003
May 2003
June 2003
July 2003
August 2003
September 2003
October 2003
November 2003
December 2003
January 2004
February 2004
March 2004
April 2004
May 2004
June 2004
July 2004
August 2004
September 2004
October 2004
November 2004
December 2004
January 2005
February 2005
March 2005
April 2005
May 2005
June 2005
July 2005
August 2005
September 2005
October 2005
November 2005
December 2005
January 2006
February 2006
March 2006
April 2006
May 2006
June 2006
July 2006
August 2006
September 2006
October 2006
November 2006
December 2006
January 2007
Interesting Articles
NY Times Workplace Safety Investigations January 2003 McWane Series
and December 2003 "When Workers Die" Series by David Barstow
Interview with Peg Seminario from the Multinational Monitor
Seattle Post-Intelligencer Series on Asbestos Legacy in Libby, Montana
Less Than Miraculous: The Near-Disaster at Quecreek Mine, by Charles
McCollester, PA Center for the Study of Labor Relations
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
FINALIST
No comments:
Post a Comment